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Recovering the Assembly Clause 
LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY.  By John D. 
Inazu.  New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2012.   
288 pages.  $55.00. 
Reviewed by Timothy Zick* 
Introduction 
I recall driving to work one day several years ago and listening to a 
radio program on which listeners were invited to call in and test their basic 
knowledge of the First Amendment.  The challenge was to name four of the 
freedoms listed in the First Amendment, or alternatively to identify the last 
names of four characters from the animated television show The Simpsons.  It 
was a small sample, to be sure, but to both my amusement (as a commuter) 
and horror (as someone who teaches and writes about the First Amendment) 
every caller was far more successful naming Simpsons characters than 
identifying First Amendment freedoms. 
As I recall, not a single caller mentioned the right “peaceably to 
assemble.”1  After reading John Inazu’s book, Liberty’s Refuge: The 
Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, the reasons for this collective memory loss 
are clearer.  As Inazu explains, the freedom of assembly has languished in 
exile for many decades.  Inazu takes the reader on the Assembly Clause’s 
fateful journey, from its prominence in the early republic,2 to its 1939 New 
York World’s Fair glory,3 to its eventual desuetude.4  He expertly recounts 
how historical, political, intellectual, and jurisprudential forces transformed a 
seemingly clear constitutional guarantee into an also-mentioned right that 
occasionally plays second fiddle to freedom of speech.  Inazu complains that 
the once-venerable “freedom of assembly” has been eclipsed and replaced by 
a judicially constructed, and doctrinally constricted, freedom of “expressive 
association.”5  As Inazu notes, the Supreme Court has not explicitly based a 
decision on the Assembly Clause in three decades.6 
In Liberty’s Refuge, Inazu ably comes to assembly’s defense.  His 
account sheds new light on the history and constitutional metamorphosis of a 
 
 * Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. 
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
2. JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY 29–34 
(2012). 
3. Id. at 55–57. 
4. Id. at 61–62. 
5. Id. at 2–3. 
6. Id. at 62. 
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critical but now largely forgotten First Amendment freedom.  That alone 
makes the book well worth reading.  However, there is much more in the 
book than exegesis and excavation.  Inazu seeks not only to rediscover 
assembly, in the sense of explaining what happened to it, but also to recover 
it in a manner that gives it contemporary relevance and force.  He argues that 
a robust freedom of assembly ought to protect the formation, composition, 
and expression of groups.7  Inazu makes some provocative claims, in the best 
sense of that term.  He pushes back against prevailing equality norms and 
principles that tend to cast groups like the Boy Scouts of America and the 
Christian Legal Society as illiberal villains.8  He forces readers to grapple 
with some uncomfortable questions regarding the limits of group autonomy 
in a liberal democracy.  He asks whether a truly robust freedom of peaceable 
assembly ought to shelter even some racially exclusionary groups.9 
I share Inazu’s desire to return the freedom of peaceable assembly to 
something like its former glory.  In Liberty’s Refuge, however, Inazu’s focus 
on the rise of expressive association and its relation to a few notable groups 
dominates the analysis to such an extent that the full import of a rediscovered 
freedom of assembly may remain somewhat obscured.  My principal 
suggestion is that we try to recover assembly in the fullest and most robust 
possible sense.  To that end, although I will make some critical observations, 
my Review will also clarify and amplify several of Inazu’s central claims.  If 
we can think of the Assembly Clause as an artifact or relic, Inazu has 
unearthed and exposed it to the light of day.  While praising this effort, I 
want to suggest how we might pull the Assembly Clause fully from the 
ground. 
Part I describes Inazu’s account of the freedom of assembly and his 
central claims.  In Part II, I address some concerns regarding interpretive 
methodology and the substantive implications of the book’s principal focus 
on illiberal and potentially dangerous assemblies.  Part III focuses on some of 
the positive, personal, and public aspects of freedom of assembly, which 
receive somewhat limited attention in the book.  Part IV concludes with a 
discussion of the implications of a fully recovered right of assembly for 
traditional forms of public protest, demonstration, and dissent. 
 
7. See id. at 2 (“The central argument of this book is that something important is lost when we 
fail to grasp the connection between a group’s formation, composition, and existence and its 
expression.”). 
8. See id. at 168–72 (arguing that the protections of assembly should apply to groups like the 
Boy Scouts and the Christian Legal Society). 
9. See id. at 13 (noting that one of the most difficult issues in balancing the right of assembly 
with antidiscrimination laws “is whether the right of assembly tolerates racial discrimination by 
peaceable, noncommercial groups”). 
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I. Recovery and Refuge 
In Liberty’s Refuge, Inazu presents compelling historical, intellectual, 
and jurisprudential narratives in order to further two primary goals.  First, he 
seeks to recover the right to peaceable assembly by tracing its roots and 
explaining its eventual transformation into a right of expressive association.  
Second, Inazu articulates a theory of freedom of assembly under which the 
First Amendment would provide greater refuge to various aspects of group 
autonomy and liberty. 
Inazu begins his examination with what, in retrospect, was clearly 
assembly’s halcyon period.  As Inazu explains in Chapter 2, in the early 
republic citizens routinely invoked and exercised the freedom to peaceably 
assemble by joining together in societies, civic organizations, public 
marches, religious rituals, and community festivals.10  In a fascinating 
historical account, Inazu demonstrates that the freedom of peaceable 
assembly has deep social, political, and constitutional roots.  He describes 
how society members, abolitionists, women’s suffrage proponents, labor 
agitators, and civil rights activists all invoked the freedom to peaceably 
assemble.11  Inazu effectively narrates assembly’s glory days as one of the 
“Four Freedoms” celebrated at the 1939 New York World’s Fair and as a 
constitutional freedom touted by public figures and the general public.12  
Chapter 2 ends, rather abruptly, with a very brief discussion of what Inazu 
refers to as the “demise of assembly.”13  As Inazu notes, “by the end of the 
1960s, the right of assembly in law and politics was largely confined to 
protests and demonstrations.”14  By the early 1980s, even this aspect of the 
right of assembly had been subsumed by First Amendment free speech 
doctrine.15 
As Inazu observes, the merger of freedom of assembly and freedom of 
speech tells only part of the story.  Something more momentous and 
transformative occurred with regard to the Assembly Clause.  In Chapters 3 
and 4, Inazu demonstrates that during what he calls the “National Security” 
and “Equality” eras the freedom of assembly was transformed into a right of 
association.16  These chapters represent the heart of Inazu’s volume and offer 
its most intriguing insights. 
 
10. Id. at 29–30. 
11. See id. at 34–44 (describing the abolitionists’ use of assemblies and noting that during the 
Progressive era, the women’s movement, the labor movement, and African-Americans all invoked 
the freedom of assembly). 
12. Id. at 55–57. 
13. Id. at 61–62. 
14. Id. at 61. 
15. See id. at 62 (“[E]ven cases involving protests or demonstrations could now be resolved 
without reference to assembly.”). 
16. Id. chs. 3, 4. 
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Most scholarly attention has focused on the path of freedom of speech 
during these critical eras.  As Inazu explains, however, during these periods 
the right of individuals to assemble in pursuit of common causes was directly 
challenged by government and ultimately legitimized in the courts.17  Inazu 
carefully examines the political, jurisprudential, and theoretical factors that 
led to the transformation and eventual interment of assembly.  In Chapter 3, 
he points to the intersection of anticommunist sentiment and the civil rights 
movement, doctrinal disagreements among Supreme Court Justices, and the 
influence of pluralist political theorists like Robert Dahl.18  In Chapter 4, he 
highlights civil rights activists’ challenges to segregationists’ claims for 
group autonomy, the development of the constitutional right to privacy, and 
the rise of Rawlsian liberalism.19 
Inazu’s central claim is that the combination of these influences 
produced a weak associative right based upon principles of liberal 
congruence and consensus.  It is difficult to gauge the degree of influence 
that political events and philosophers have on the process of constitutional 
interpretation.  The right of expressive association appears to have been 
constructed through a type of common law constitutional interpretation.20  
Having first (wrongly) tethered the right of assembly to the right to petition 
and later ventured into the realm of constitutional privacy, the Supreme 
Court eventually arrived at the nontextual and ancillary (to speech) right of 
association.  Nonetheless, in terms of the substance of expressive association 
Inazu’s political and theoretical narratives support his conclusion that the 
right the Court ultimately recognized “depoliticizes and disembodies 
expression in order to neutralize dissent.”21  Inazu characterizes the 
association right as an “enfeebled” version of assembly that restricts group 
autonomy, suppresses dissent, and pushes groups toward conformity and 
congruence.22  In sum, he argues that the “forgetting of assembly and the 
embrace of association . . . marked the loss of meaningful protections for the 
dissenting, political, and expressive group.”23 
As part of his restorative project, in Chapter 5 Inazu articulates a 
“political theory of assembly.”24  He finds intellectual support for this theory 
in the work of Sheldon Wolin.  Wolin criticized Rawls and other consensus 
 
17. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (protecting the 
NAACP from state scrutiny of its membership lists). 
18. INAZU, supra note 2, at ch. 3. 
19. Id. at ch. 4. 
20. See generally DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) (arguing that many 
areas of constitutional doctrine, including freedom of speech, developed according to common law 
methods and principles). 
21. INAZU, supra note 2, at 155. 
22. Id. at 4. 
23. Id. 
24. See id. at 153–57 (citing SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND 
INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (2004)) (discussing Sheldon Wolin’s scholarship). 
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theorists for demonizing dissent and disagreement and for falsely equating 
conformity and politeness with civic reasonableness.25  Wolin argued that 
dissent, social conflict, and nonconformity are necessary destabilizing 
components of a healthy democracy.26  With Wolin and against pluralist and 
liberal theorists, Inazu argues for a conception of assembly “that resists the 
state’s push for consensus and control.”27  Inazu claims that robust protection 
for group autonomy allows individuals to create distance between individuals 
and the state.  Rather than having democracy’s substance and limits dictated 
by a monist state, he argues that assembly empowers groups to experiment 
with various democratic forms and practices.28  Inazu’s political defense of 
group autonomy offers a strong counternarrative to that relied upon by 
antidiscrimination proponents (most notably Andrew Koppelman).29 
Although he anticipates that a variety of civic, religious, and other 
groups would benefit from a recovered freedom of assembly, Inazu is 
particularly concerned with extending protection to groups that act or wish to 
act contrary to what is commonly perceived to be the “common good.”30  As 
Inazu envisions it, a robust freedom of assembly would provide “strong 
protections for the formation, composition, expression, and gathering of 
groups, especially those groups that dissent from majoritarian standards.”31 
Although he discusses other aspects of group autonomy, Inazu focuses 
primarily on protection for group membership decisions.  Thus, according to 
Inazu’s account, the biggest losers in the gradual disappearance and 
transformation of assembly into expressive association are groups that resist 
or fail to comply with pluralist and liberal norms relating to inclusion and 
equality.32  Throughout the book, Inazu focuses primarily on groups like the 
Jaycees, the Boy Scouts (who have recently affirmed their policy against 
openly gay Scouts or adult Scout Masters),33 the Christian Legal Society, and 
all-male fraternities.34  Invoking equality principles and antidiscrimination 
laws, plaintiffs and governments pressed such organizations to open their 
doors to all comers.35  Courts have mainly, although not uniformly, held that 
 
25. See id. at 154–56 (citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) and WOLIN, supra 
note 24) (discussing theories of Dahl, Rawls, and Wolin). 
26. Id. at 156. 
27. Id. at 162. 
28. Id. at 5–6. 
29. Id. at 162–66. 
30. Id. at 152–53. 
31. Id. 
32. See id. at 171 (arguing that under one popular theory of expressive association, “every 
group that challenged antidiscrimination law” would be subjugated to the state if the state 
determined that “discrimination is central to the group’s core expression”). 
33. Erik Eckholm, Boy Scouts to Continue Excluding Gay People, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/18/us/boy-scouts-reaffirm-ban-on-gay-members.html?_r=0. 
34. INAZU, supra note 2, at 132–46. 
35. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 645 (2000) (“The complaint alleged 
that the Boy Scouts had violated New Jersey’s public accommodations statute and its common law 
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antidiscrimination principles trump group autonomy.36  In contrast, Inazu 
envisions a “meaningful pluralism” that countenances “all-male fraternities, 
all-male Jaycees, and all-Christian student groups,” as well as “all-female 
sororities, all-female health clubs, and all-gay social clubs.”37  Perhaps most 
controversially, Inazu’s conception of group autonomy might be broad 
enough to grant some First Amendment protection to the exclusionary 
policies of some private groups that exclude individuals on the basis of 
race.38 
Inazu does not address in detail how courts would actually enforce a 
recovered right of assembly.  He defines it as a “presumptive right of 
individuals to form and participate in peaceable, noncommercial groups.”39  
Inazu briefly considers the textual limitation that is suggested by the 
adjective “peaceably.”  He suggests that this may exclude such things as 
“[c]riminal conspiracies, violent uprisings, and even most forms of civil 
disobedience.”40  Inazu also posits a nontextual limitation, namely that 
commercial groups are not entitled to protection under the Assembly 
Clause.41  For groups that are presumptively protected by the Assembly 
Clause, Inazu proposes that courts apply a “contextual” analysis that 
considers “how power operates on the ground.”42  Where private groups 
overreach, as for example when they exercise monopoly power with respect 
to certain goods or services, the state may be able to rebut the presumptive 
protection afforded under the Assembly Clause.43  However, in most cases, 
Inazu expects that the presumption will prevail against governmental 
interference with groups’ autonomous decision making.44 
Liberty’s Refuge is an important contribution to the First Amendment 
literature.  It provides a thick, careful, and intellectually rigorous account of a 
freedom that has languished for too long and which judges, lawyers, 
 
by revoking [the Plaintiff’s] membership based solely on his sexual orientation.”); Bd. of Dirs. of 
Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 541–42 (1987) (seeking an injunction on the 
grounds that an international Rotary Club’s revocation of one of its members’ local charters, 
because the local club had admitted women members, violated the Unruh Civil Rights Act). 
36. See, e.g., Rotary Int’l, 481 U.S. at 547 (holding that “application of the Unruh Act to local 
Rotary Clubs does not interfere unduly with the members’ freedom of private association”).  But 
see, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S. at 659 (holding that the First Amendment prohibits the state from requiring 
that the respondent be readmitted to the Boy Scouts through the application of its public 
accommodations law, which does not justify such a severe intrusion on the Boy Scouts’ right to 
freedom of expressive association). 
37. INAZU, supra note 2, at 11. 
38. Id. at 14. 
39. Id. at 166. 
40. Id. at 167. 
41. Id. at 167–68.  For a critique of this specific limitation, see generally Robert K. Vischer, 
How Necessary Is the Right of Assembly?, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1403 (2012). 
42. INAZU, supra note 2, at 172. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at 169 (arguing that “in almost all cases, the protections of assembly should 
prevail”). 
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scholars, and citizens have paid far too little attention to over the past several 
decades.  Inazu’s book also tells a cautionary tale about constitutional 
meaning and textual transformation, and demonstrates the importance of 
giving full effect to the entirety of the First Amendment’s text.  Liberty’s 
Refuge does not purport to provide a final answer or set of answers regarding 
the scope and limits of the freedom of assembly.  Having recovered the 
Assembly Clause, Inazu merely points us in the direction of its future 
enforcement. 
II. Interpreting Assembly 
The question of interpretive methodology is an important one, 
particularly as it relates to a constitutional provision that has been in exile for 
decades.  Having mistakenly abandoned assembly, the Supreme Court could 
conceivably resurrect it by providing a new substantive account.  The recent 
treatment of the Second Amendment is instructive in this regard.  Inazu’s 
account raises several interpretive concerns.  What sources ought to be 
consulted in re-interpreting the right of peaceable assembly?  What 
justifications are there for adopting a distinctly political theory of assembly 
that focuses primarily on protecting the autonomy of dissenting groups?  
Should the interpretive model be atomistic, in the sense that it focuses on a 
single First Amendment provision, or holistic, in the sense that it synthesizes 
assembly and other rights?  Finally, does Inazu’s primary focus on dissent 
and nonconformance risk offering too much protection for illiberal and 
violent groups?  Although these are serious concerns, I think Inazu has 
offered some convincing responses.  I want to amplify a bit on those 
responses, and to suggest some additional support for them. 
A. Eclectic and Atomistic Methodologies 
The extent to which the Assembly Clause protects the sort of group 
autonomy Inazu identifies is not clear from its text.  Perhaps assembly is a 
temporal right—meaning that it applies only to temporary groupings or 
affiliations, which must remain peaceable for their duration.  If so, 
longstanding organizations like the Boy Scouts would find no refuge under 
the Assembly Clause.  Further, we could interpret the requirement that 
assemblies be “peaceable” as a requirement that they respect equality rights.  
Under this interpretation, peaceable activity is activity that conforms to 
certain consensus norms regarding public order and social tranquility.  Or, in 
terms of external limits, one might argue that the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Equal Protection Clause was intended to modify or limit the First 
Amendment’s protection for freedom of assembly. 
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As noted earlier, Inazu claims that the Assembly Clause ought generally 
to protect groups against imposition of consensus norms.45  He argues that 
the substantive meaning of the Assembly Clause can be derived in part from 
political and philosophical principles of dissent and nonconformity.  Is this 
theoretical account attractive because it is consistent with the original 
understanding?  Because it comports with a structural interpretation of the 
Bill of Rights?  Or is Inazu’s interpretation simply the best answer given all 
of the available historical and other evidence we have regarding freedom of 
assembly? 
Inazu acknowledges the importance of interpretive methodology.  His 
approach is refreshingly transparent.  Inazu states that he is using an eclectic 
interpretive model, which is to say that no particular methodology (i.e., 
originalism, textualism, living constitutionalism) propels his interpretation of 
the Assembly Clause.46  Thus, Inazu engages in a textualist approach when 
he renders a close reading of the text and (correctly, in my view) decouples 
freedom of assembly from the right to petition government for a redress of 
grievances.47  He makes copious use of history, structural arguments, 
prudential principles, and various other constitutional “modalities” in 
examining the Assembly Clause.  Inazu’s political theory of assembly is 
consistent with these sources; to a large extent, it follows from them. 
Eclecticism is a defensible mode of constitutional interpretation.  
Indeed, for a rights guarantee like the Assembly Clause that has been 
dormant for so long it may be the best method of recovering meaning.48  The 
freedom of assembly is, as Inazu ably demonstrates, a product of historical, 
social, and political events and influences.  Its meaning has been forged over 
time in the courts, in public debate, in national celebrations, and even in 
international diplomacy.  Inazu’s eclectic and interdisciplinary approach 
rightly takes account of all of these contexts and sources. 
Given the centrality of group discrimination to his account, Inazu might 
have paid somewhat more attention to the intersection of the First 
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Moreover, he might have 
avoided framing the question as one involving a choice between Dahl and 
Rawls, on the one hand, and Wolin on the other.  We are not actually 
choosing among political theorists or political theories, but among plausible 
interpretations of constitutional text.  However, Inazu’s account seems to be 
consistent with all of the available historical, structural, and other evidence 
relating to the freedom of assembly.  He offers substantial evidence to 
 
45. See id. at 155 (arguing, contrary to the view of consensus theorists, that groups with 
different, unpopular views should be protected). 
46. Id. at 17–19. 
47. Id. at 23–25. 
48. Cf. STRAUSS, supra note 20, at 55 (arguing that “the text and the original understandings of 
the First Amendment are essentially irrelevant to the American system of freedom of expression as 
it exists today”). 
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support his interpretation, and suggests reasons to doubt alternative 
interpretive accounts—including Andrew Koppelman’s historical narrative, 
which Inazu claims is incomplete and privileges equality concerns over 
group autonomy and liberty.49  In light of all of this evidence, as Inazu 
correctly notes, the burden rests on others to come forward with a more 
plausible account. 
Inazu’s interpretive methodology is both eclectic and atomistic.  By 
atomistic I mean that it focuses intently on a single clause or rights provision 
and examines it mostly in isolation from other constitutional text.  Other 
constitutional scholars, including some who have examined First 
Amendment freedoms, have adopted a similar approach.50  There are both 
benefits and costs associated with this kind of atomistic methodology. 
On the considerable plus side, scholars engaging in atomistic 
interpretation are able to offer deep historical and intellectual accounts of 
constitutional rights and other provisions.  By zeroing in on the Assembly 
Clause, Inazu is able to offer a granular, detailed, and intellectually thick 
account of the right to peaceably assemble.  Like eclecticism, atomistic 
interpretation may be particularly well suited to contexts in which 
constitutional text has been exiled or significantly transformed over time. 
On the cost side, atomistic interpretation can lead to a degree of myopia.  
Inazu’s approach is situated at the opposite extreme from works like Thomas 
Emerson’s iconic The System of Freedom of Expression.51  Emerson treated 
the First Amendment’s expressive liberties—speech, press, assembly, and 
petition—as part of an interrelated system that served core functions such as 
individual fulfillment, the search for truth, and self-governance.52  Emerson 
incorporated a discussion of the right to peaceably assemble into this 
systematic account.53  He interpreted assembly and other First Amendment 
rights as protections against regulating belief, coercing orthodoxy, and 
insisting on congruence and conformity.54 
These are essentially the same core values that Inazu ascribes to the 
freedom of assembly.  Thus, there is apparently some connective tissue that 
 
49. See INAZU, supra note 2, at 162–66 (citing ANDREW KOPPELMAN WITH TOBIAS 
BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?  HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA V. 
JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION 1–24 (2009)) (summarizing differences 
between Inazu’s historical narrative and Koppelman’s narrative regarding association). 
50. The most notable recent example, which examines the First Amendment’s Petition Clause, 
is RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS LIBEL, 
“OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS OF 
GRIEVANCES (2012). 
51. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970). 
52. See id. at 6–7 (stating that the system of freedom of expression is an essential means of 
assuring individual self-fulfillment, advancing knowledge and discovering truth, and providing for 
participation in decision making by all members of society). 
53. See id. at 286–92 (discussing the vital role that the “various modes of public assembly and 
petition play in a modern system of free expression”). 
54. See id. at 292–388 (discussing rights of peaceable assembly and petition). 
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binds the First Amendment’s provisions together.  One of the weaknesses of 
Inazu’s atomistic interpretation is that it treats the Assembly Clause as an 
island of liberty rather than as part of an interlocking and mutually 
supportive system.  This makes it more difficult to determine how freedom of 
assembly relates to or intersects with other freedoms.  Thus we learn from 
Inazu’s account that “assembly is a form of expression” and that it protects 
groups from state-enforced conformity and congruence.55  What is less clear, 
though, is how the freedom of assembly might differ from, support, or 
operate within the First Amendment’s system. 
Atomistic interpretation makes it more difficult to determine what 
marks the freedom of assembly as distinctive or unique relative to other 
neighboring First Amendment rights.  In the context of a public parade or 
protest, for example, citizens may be engaging simultaneously in freedom of 
speech, petition, and assembly.  What, if anything, is distinctive about the 
freedom of assembly in this context?  What distinguishes it, in either form or 
substance, from the rights of expression and petition?  Early in his account, 
Inazu notes that assembly overlaps with religious freedoms.  Indeed, freedom 
of assembly’s roots can be traced back to the trial of William Penn, a Quaker 
who was infamously charged with assembling for religious purposes.56  As 
Inazu’s examples involving Christian campus organizations and Jewish 
fraternities show,57 in some important respects the connection between 
assembly and religious free exercise remains close today.  What is distinctive 
about the Assembly Clause in the context of religious assemblies?  Why 
ought it, rather than the Free Exercise Clause, apply when adjudicating 
formation and composition questions relating to religious groups?58 
Other holistic or synthetic interpretive questions occurred to me as I 
read Liberty’s Refuge.  For instance, might a fully recovered freedom of 
assembly correct some of the errors, ambiguities, or weaknesses of free 
speech doctrine?  The social pressure to conform to majority norms and to 
avoid social conflict is quite strong.  First Amendment protection for some 
anonymous speech offers only a partial antidote to privacy concerns.59  As 
Inazu suggests, the freedom of assembly provides refuge from state 
interference with group formation.60  Perhaps freedom of assembly, rather 
 
55. See INAZU, supra note 2, at 4–5 (highlighting how the right of expressive association 
provides strong protection for the formation, composition, expression, and gathering of groups and 
enables meaningful dissent from majoritarian standards). 
56. Id. at 24–25. 
57. Id. at 144–45. 
58. See generally Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, Assembly Resurrected, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 351 (2012) 
(considering the question of how the Religion Clauses should interact with the Assembly Clause). 
59. Cf. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 349–53 (1995) (recognizing in dicta 
that a state’s interest in preventing fraud and libel might justify a limited identification 
requirement). 
60. See INAZU, supra note 2, at 4 (arguing that the four principles of the history of assembly 
collectively counsel for the protection of group formation). 
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than or in addition to freedom of speech, provides a substantive basis for 
protection against certain forms of state surveillance.  If so, then the relevant 
First Amendment question would not be whether the state’s actions have 
“chilled” speech in some tangible way, but rather whether they have 
interfered with a private group’s autonomy regarding formation and 
composition.61 
To be clear, I am not suggesting that Inazu’s interpretation is 
illegitimate because it lacks Emersonian breadth.  Like the eclectic model, 
the choice to delve deeply and thickly with respect to a right or clause rather 
than more holistically or comparatively is a valid interpretive scholarly 
choice.  Inazu acknowledges that more systematic work must be done.  As he 
states in the book’s conclusion, “if courts were to reaffirm the continued 
importance of the freedom of assembly, then they would need to explain its 
doctrinal framework and outline the relationship of assembly to other First 
Amendment freedoms.”62  But perhaps in this instance what Inazu views as 
the cart ought to come before the horse.  If we were able to more fully 
recover and explain what is distinctive about the freedom of assembly, we 
might have more success convincing courts that they ought to reaffirm this 
forgotten right. 
B. Recovering Assembly’s Darker Side 
Below I discuss some of the more positive social and political functions 
of assembly.  In interpreting the Assembly Clause, Inazu’s focus is 
elsewhere.  He is particularly concerned with protecting the membership 
decisions of nonconforming groups.  This orientation could create the 
impression that a recovered right of assembly will be useful primarily to 
society’s most illiberal and dangerous assemblies.  Why recover a right that 
benefits mobs and troublemakers?  As Professor Bhagwat asks in a recent 
symposium contribution, is the freedom of assembly a refuge for 
constitutional liberty or a refuge for “scoundrels”?63  Bhagwat is rightly 
concerned that the limits of the freedom of assembly be clearly defined, in 
particular with regard to potentially violent groups.  Both in the book itself 
and in subsequent commentary,64 Inazu offers some tentative responses to 
readers’ concerns about assembly’s darker side.  Here, again, I want to 
elaborate on these responses and to offer some additional observations about 
the importance of protecting dissent and social conflict as manifested in 
 
61. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1972) (holding that plaintiffs who objected to U.S. 
Army surveillance had not established standing to challenge the data-gathering program because 
they had not shown any regulatory effect on their expressive activities). 
62. INAZU, supra note 2, at 186. 
63. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Liberty’s Refuge, or the Refuge of Scoundrels?: The Limits of the Right 
of Assembly, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1381, 1381 (2012). 
64. See, e.g., John D. Inazu, Factions for the Rest of Us, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1435, 1438–40 
(2012) (responding to concerns about the line between peaceable and violent assembly). 
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assemblies.  In Part III, I will focus on the more positive aspects of freedom 
of assembly that receive less attention in Inazu’s account. 
Inazu argues that freedom of assembly ought to protect against certain 
forms of state-enforced orthodoxy.65  In most cases, the freedom of peaceable 
assembly ought to bar coercive attempts by government to control the 
internal norms and practices of private assemblies.  In a society that 
celebrates individualism but generally expects group conformity with regard 
to certain social norms and practices, a conception of pluralism that actually 
facilitates difference is indeed critically important.  Inazu singles out a few 
organizations such as the Boy Scouts and the Christian Legal Society, which 
have been involved in recent high-profile disputes.66  However, this sort of 
protection is also important to a host of other groups.  Among these are 
American Muslims, Wiccans, Occupy Wall Street protesters, “Birthers,” 
conspiracy theorists, medical marijuana advocates, Tea Party members, day 
laborers, labor strikers, gun advocates, and other individuals who join 
together and share creeds, causes, or conditions that many do not view as 
serving the common good. 
It is not easy to be a dissenter or a nonconformist in America.  That  
may strike some as an odd assertion.  After all, Americans celebrate 
countercultural trends and actions.  Indeed, they sometimes make heroes of 
nonconformists.  However, it is still far easier to get along if one goes along 
with prevailing social and political norms.  Dissenters and nonconformists 
face considerable pressures, both from government regulators and prevailing 
cultural forces, to get on board or in line.67  Members of the dissenting and 
other out groups mentioned above can certainly attest to the pressure placed 
upon them to conform to majority religious, social, and political norms.  
They are frequently labeled discriminators, bigots, outsiders, weirdos, 
whackos, whiners, freeloaders, and closed-minded ideologues.68  Whether 
they take the form of public protest movements, group memberships, or 
fringe causes, dissent and nonconformity can still use all the assistance they 
can get.  Dissenting and nonconforming groups are not threats to democracy; 
 
65. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
66. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
67. See, e.g., Max Abelson, Occupy Plans ‘S17’ Wall Street Tie-Up, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 
2012, at A3 (detailing plans for a demonstration to mark the one-year anniversary of the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, despite challenges posed by protester “burnout,” and recounting how 
“governments around the world used concussion grenades, gas, riot gear, pepper spray and arrests to 
disband camps and protests”); Tina Susman & Andrew Tangel, Protesters March Back to Wall 
Street, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2012, at A8 (noting that more than 180 protesters were arrested during 
the one-year anniversary demonstration and describing popular criticisms of the movement for its 
“lack of focus” and its “failure to . . . adopt specific issues”). 
68. See, e.g., Editorial, Occupy Plus One Year, N.Y. POST, Sept. 17, 2012, at 24 (characterizing 
Occupy Wall Street protestors as “obnoxious outliers” and a “ragtag assemblage of stragglers, 
radicals, moochers, trust-fund sophists, bums, rapists, drug-dealers, petty criminals and cop-car 
poopers”). 
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they are central components of our political and constitutional system.  One 
of Inazu’s signal contributions is to remind us of this easily forgotten fact. 
Of course, there is a darker side to freedom of assembly.  Some groups 
may actually be dangerous.  As Professor Bhagwat has observed, a broad 
freedom of assembly might facilitate the formation and activities of violent 
groups.69  Here, though, we must be careful not to adopt a common fallacy.  
During far too many periods of American history, including the current era, 
public officials and the public at large have equated assemblies with angry 
and destructive mobs.70  Although his historical account is otherwise thick, 
Inazu underemphasizes this part of assembly’s narrative. 
Groups that reject consensus norms and occupy positions at the fringe 
of American culture ought not to be, for that reason alone, considered threats 
to national security or public safety.  Of course, it is true that as collective 
enterprises, assemblies can be more dangerous than individual actors.  None 
of the individual perpetrators of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
United States could have done as much damage acting alone.  Many other 
dangerous networks, groups, and associations, including separatists and 
neoracists, currently reside in the United States.  As Inazu notes, however, 
the Assembly Clause protects only “peaceable” forms of assembly.  That 
clearly excludes individuals who assemble for the common purpose of 
engaging in acts of violence.  Freedom of assembly offers no First 
Amendment immunity or defense for participants in criminal conspiracies 
such as the September 11 attacks. 
Beyond this point, Inazu has conceded that he “lack[s] a clear sense of 
where the peaceability line ought to be drawn.”71  I do not think this is an 
acute problem.  With regard to violent conspiracies and the like, as Inazu has 
noted, the First Amendment is essentially irrelevant.72  This is true whether 
we are talking about freedom of speech or a recovered version of freedom of 
assembly.  With regard to other out groups that do not intend to or actually 
engage in violent activities, the presumption of protection ought to apply.  As 
I discuss below, the “peaceably” limitation would seem to present the most 
acute interpretive difficulties as applied to assemblies engaged in civil 
disobedience and other nonconforming, but nonviolent, activities.  Even here 
the danger of an expansive right of assembly will likely be minimal.  The 
assemblies at issue are likely to form or act in the open, on public streets and 
 
69. Bhagwat, supra note 63, at 1394–96. 
70. See, e.g., Carolyn Jones, Oakland’s Top Administrator Tough Enough for City She Loves, 
S.F. CHRON., July 8, 2012, at A1 (profiling Oakland City Administrator Deanna Santana, who 
issued the final eviction notice to Occupy Wall Street protestors in Frank Ogawa Plaza on the basis 
of “safety issues,” and quoting Santana expressing her concern that “if this place went up in flames, 
it’d be on me”); Andrew Tangel, At 1 Year, Occupy’s Effect Is Still Hard to Gauge, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 15, 2012, at A1 (“Polls have shown that the public generally supports Occupy[] [Wall 
Street’s] message but not its disruptive tactics.”). 
71. Inazu, supra note 64, at 1438. 
72. Id. at 1440 & n.29. 
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in public parks where regulations define what is and is not lawful in terms of 
public protests and other forms of outdoor social conflict. 
Perhaps Inazu’s most provocative claim relates not to violent groups but 
to private assemblies that engage in racially or ethnically discriminatory 
practices.  As Inazu forthrightly acknowledges, the suggestion that some 
such groups ought to receive refuge under the Assembly Clause is the most 
troubling and tentative in his volume.73 
I am not sure that we ought to protect the membership and other 
decisions of such assemblies—even if we currently allow them to use the 
public streets to engage in protest and other forms of expression.  I do not 
think that it suffices to say, as Inazu has in defending this part of his analysis, 
that some degree of overprotection of freedom of assembly follows 
ineluctably from the logic of overprotection of freedom of speech.74  The fact 
that some offensive and even vile expression is protected as part of the price 
for a robust freedom of speech does not necessarily answer the question 
whether we ought to protect discriminatory conduct by private groups or 
tolerate hateful organizations.  Whether the First Amendment ought to 
protect degrading and hateful expression remains a matter of significant and 
ongoing debate.75  Further, the Supreme Court’s observation that free speech 
“may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of 
unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people 
to anger” does not necessarily map well onto the sorts of private decision 
making Inazu discusses in the book.76  The costs of exclusion and the societal 
dynamics associated with discriminatory groups may well require a different 
calculus and some distinct limitations. 
Here, though, is another place where examining the ties to other First 
Amendment rights might bear some fruit.  Might there be, for example, some 
notion of “counter-assembly” under which groups that are offensive to even 
the most deeply held societal norms are countered by groups that accept such 
norms?77  Single-sex educational institutions compete with coeducational 
ones.  Groups espousing traditional heterosexual marriage are countered by 
numerous gay rights groups.  Male-only fraternities coexist on campuses 
across the country with female-only sororities.  The National Rifle 
Association regularly spars with countless gun control groups.  And civil 
rights groups keep tabs on and challenge racist organizations.  Or perhaps we 
 
73. INAZU, supra note 2, at 14. 
74. Inazu, supra note 64, at 1437. 
75. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, THE HARM IN HATE SPEECH (2012) (arguing for more 
regulation of hate speech, contrary to the mainstream position of overprotection). 
76. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). 
77. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (noting that, 
except in emergencies, the remedy for exposing falsehoods in speech is more speech, not 
repression), overruled in part by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
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ought to develop a theory of tolerance that is uniquely related to assembly.78  
We might also borrow from the pluralist approach that has developed under 
the First Amendment’s religion clauses.79  So long as there are meaningful 
rights of entry and exit, and the group has no monopolistic power or 
characteristics, the state really ought to remain neutral with regard to the 
formation and composition of assemblies.  Again, I am not sure that we 
ought to provide these or other justifications for protecting the autonomy of 
illiberal assemblies.  But if we are to do so, more theoretical thought and 
effort must be devoted to producing a justification for extending assembly so 
far. 
Inazu is undoubtedly correct that if the Assembly Clause is revived in 
the manner he suggests, we will have to think very carefully about the 
amount of breathing space we want to create for certain kinds of assemblies.  
In terms of managing this concern, Inazu has cast significant doubt on the 
expressive association doctrine.  Determining how the problem of invidious 
discrimination by groups ought to be resolved under the Assembly Clause is 
a matter that requires further reflection. 
III. The Forms and Functions of Peaceable Assembly 
Liberty’s Refuge offers a compelling argument that institutional 
autonomy, in particular with respect to membership decision making, is a 
critical aspect of freedom of assembly.80  However, a fully recovered 
freedom of assembly would protect a diverse array of groups and would 
serve important functions, some of which Inazu addresses only briefly.  For 
the purpose of amplification, and toward the end of taking assembly’s fullest 
possible measure, this Part examines more closely the forms and functions of 
assembly. 
A. Assembly’s Diverse Forms 
What is an “assembly”?  Although Inazu is an otherwise careful 
textualist,81 he does not offer a basic definition of this term (as opposed to a 
definition of the right of assembly itself).  An assembly is “a group of people 
gathered together in one place for a common purpose.”82  The shared space 
 
78. See generally LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986) (advancing the theory that societies that are tolerant of 
ideas that are legitimately unworthy of protection are strengthened by that tolerance). 
79. See generally Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409 (1990) (dicussing the Free Exercise Clause’s origins 
in religious pluralism). 
80. INAZU, supra note 2, at 152–53. 
81. For example, Inazu convincingly argues that freedom of assembly and freedom to petition 
government for a redress of grievances are independent and freestanding rights.  Id. at 23–25.  Inazu 
is also careful to note that “peaceably” limits the scope of the right of assembly.  Id. at 166–67. 
82. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 95 (2001). 
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may be physical or virtual.83  The common purposes may be social, political, 
religious, cultural, or educational.  Although he acknowledges other forms, 
Inazu focuses primarily on groups or assemblies that are longstanding, 
organized institutions.  As noted earlier, Inazu’s interpretive and normative 
accounts treat the primary function of freedom of assembly as preserving 
autonomous space for dissenting and nonconforming organizations and 
institutions.84 
In Chapter 2’s historical narrative, Inazu describes an extraordinary 
variety of assemblies.  He discusses societies, institutions, congregations, 
organizations, rituals, feasts, protests, parades, and demonstrations.  These 
types of gatherings have long been a critical part of American social, civic, 
and political culture.  Indeed, they remain so today.  After describing this 
rich history, however, Inazu’s analysis conveys the impression that 
“assembly” and “organization” are synonymous terms and that the core of a 
recovered freedom of assembly is protection for group autonomy—
particularly for certain well-organized, illiberal groups that face public 
disapproval and discrimination lawsuits.  This orientation is in large part 
owing to Inazu’s following the path forged by the Supreme Court, which led 
ultimately to recognition of the right of expressive association. 
As Inazu clearly recognizes, however, assemblies take many forms.  
Assemblies can be quite small or very large.  They can have private or public 
orientations.  Historically, the right to assemble has protected the formation 
and composition of a diverse array of private groups including social clubs 
and churches.  Some of these private groups are formed with the intention of 
making public claims, while others seek generally to maintain a more private 
existence and profile.  Indeed, some groups form with the expectation that 
they and their members will remain completely anonymous. 
As the discussion in Chapter 2 also shows, assemblies can be formally 
or informally organized.  We might think of them as being situated on a 
continuum, ranging from longstanding institutions to spontaneous and casual 
gatherings.  Assemblies may be organized with regard to a specific message 
or ideology, or they may be looser forms of alliance.  They may be heavily 
regulated, as in the case of political parties, or they may operate mainly 
beyond and outside the state’s control.  Assemblies may be aligned against 
the state, or in some cases constituted specifically to support current public 
laws and policies. 
Finally, assemblies have both collective and individual characteristics.  
They protect both organizational and individual interests.  In his recuperative 
account, Inazu does not entirely ignore the individual dimension of assembly.  
But as I discuss below, for the most part he appears to conceptualize freedom 
of assembly as a form of protection for groups and specifically for their 
 
83. Inazu examines virtual assemblies in a forthcoming paper.  See John D. Inazu, Virtual 
Assembly, 98 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
84. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. 
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organizational autonomy.  However, as a personal freedom, the right to 
peaceably assemble belongs to each of the individuals who choose to 
participate in the formation and activities of the common venture. 
In sum, assemblies in various forms are everywhere and all around us.  
Indeed, wherever two or more people gather in a common space an assembly 
has taken place. 
The ability to gather in public has been a particularly important aspect 
of the freedom of assembly.  As American history demonstrates, less 
structured and even spontaneous gatherings were in many cases the principal 
beneficiaries of a freedom of peaceable assembly.  The freedom of assembly 
has facilitated traditional public displays such as pickets, demonstrations, 
parades, and protests.  In contrast to the civic and religious organizations 
Inazu focuses on in the book, this is assembly’s core dimension. 
As Inazu briefly mentions early in the book, the Assembly Clause 
protects “the occasional, temporal gathering that often takes the form of a 
protest, parade, or demonstration.”85  Indeed, I think this is not only the 
traditional but perhaps also the most natural reading of the First 
Amendment’s Assembly Clause.  On the infrequent occasions when it has 
mentioned assembly, the Supreme Court seems to have agreed.  Writing for 
all but one Justice in Edwards v. South Carolina86 in 1963, Justice Stewart 
described a civil rights demonstration by 187 students on the State Capitol 
grounds as the exercise of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition 
for redress of grievances “in their most pristine and classic form.”87  The 
classic assembly consisted of a group of citizens gathered in the public 
square for a peaceful and temporary demonstration.  These individuals were, 
and as I will explain, in some sense remain, most in need of the refuge of 
freedom of assembly. 
At the end of his historical narrative in Chapter 2, Inazu notes with 
evident disappointment that by the 1960s the Supreme Court appeared to 
have limited freedom of assembly to public assemblies, protests, and 
demonstrations.88  The real disappointment, as Inazu only briefly mentions, is 
that within the next two decades the Court buried even this “pristine and 
classic” form of assembly under an ever-expanding free speech doctrine.89 
Of course, if the Assembly Clause does not protect the most obvious 
and traditional associative endeavors, then it could be difficult to establish 
that it provides refuge for the formation, composition, and expression of civic 
and other organizations that are highly structured and do not exist to make 
public claims.  Perhaps Inazu believes that protection for the more traditional 
forms of assembly such as protests, parades, and demonstrations is 
 
85. INAZU, supra note 2, at 2. 
86. 372 U.S. 229 (1963). 
87. Id. at 235. 
88. INAZU, supra note 2, at 61. 
89. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 235; INAZU, supra note 2, at 61–62. 
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meaningfully assured under the Free Speech Clause, or that such protection 
will simply be a natural byproduct of the recognition of group autonomy he 
espouses.  At least in the specific sense Inazu describes and analyzes the 
concept, group autonomy has not been the central concern of traditional 
assemblies.  Given the challenges to traditional assembly, which included 
vigilante responses as well as official forms of suppression and abuse, 
restrictions on formation and composition were subordinate concerns.  If we 
are to fully recover the Assembly Clause, we need to reconceive how it 
applies to more traditional forms and functions.  In other words, the recovery 
effort ought to begin at assembly’s roots. 
I do not mean to argue that the freedom of assembly cannot be extended 
beyond traditional public gatherings, or that its meaning is frozen in time in 
some originalist sense.  As Inazu observes, groups of individuals who have 
historically joined under an organizational umbrella or operated as 
hierarchical institutions have long claimed to be engaged in acts of 
assembly.90  Although most of these groups used repertoires like 
demonstrations and protests, not all of them did.  This history is certainly 
some evidence of the American public’s own interpretation of assembly.91  
Moreover, as a matter of simple definition, the groups whose autonomy 
Inazu is most concerned with protecting qualify as “assemblies.”  My 
concern is not that Inazu has wrongly or illegitimately interpreted the First 
Amendment’s text, but rather that in his effort to transform “association” 
back into “assembly” Inazu may have given an inordinate amount of 
attention to a specific subset or type of assemblies, or to a specific problem 
created by the Supreme Court’s interpretive adventurism.  After Chapter 2, 
the more traditional forms of public assembly fade from view.  In Part IV, I 
will examine how a recovered Assembly Clause might facilitate more 
traditional forms of public contention and dissent. 
B. Assembly’s Functions 
As I have noted, Inazu is principally concerned with demonstrating how 
and why group autonomy has been harmed by the First Amendment doctrine 
of expressive association.  Under his account, the primary beneficiaries of a 
recovered freedom of assembly would be dissident, exclusionary, and 
 
90. I am less certain whether the assembly label applies in cases like Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).  In that case, American citizens sought to engage in peaceful 
expressive activities such as the teaching of international law to designated foreign terrorist 
organizations.  Id. at 2716.  These individuals sometimes occupied common space and worked for a 
common purpose.  See id. (describing the types of activities in which plaintiffs intended to engage, 
including training, offering legal expertise, and engaging in advocacy on behalf of the designated 
foreign terrorist organizations).  In that sense, they meet the definition of an assembly.  I am not 
certain how Inazu believes a recovered right of assembly would have assisted the plaintiffs in 
Humanitarian Law Project or altered the Court’s analysis.  Inazu seems to use the case primarily to 
demonstrate the ambiguity of the right of “expressive association.”  INAZU, supra note 2, at 4–6. 
91. See generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 17–18 (2011) (emphasizing the 
citizenry’s understanding of constitutional provisions as an aspect of constitutional interpretation). 
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nonconforming organizations or groups.  Inazu is particularly concerned with 
preserving space in which such groups can participate in self-governance 
(relatively) free from state interference.  This is especially important for 
groups that engage in dissent, fail to conform to consensus norms and 
practices with regard to such things as political organization and rational 
discourse, and form alliances whose particular message may not be apparent 
to outsiders (including, in particular, judges).92  On Inazu’s negative reading, 
the freedom of assembly allows private groups to resist the state’s efforts to 
impose what Inazu claims are majority norms of consensus, congruence, and 
conformity. 
Inazu addresses some of the most important defensive or negative 
attributes of a right of peaceable assembly.  He argues that assembly is “most 
relevant when its exercise is challenged by the state.”93  But Inazu’s focus on 
the struggle between certain private groups and the state’s mechanisms of 
control downplays some of the more positive and personal aspects of the 
freedom of assembly.  If we are to fully recover and restore the freedom of 
assembly, we must exhume not only its various forms but also its diverse 
functions.  Moreover, we ought to consider those functions not from the 
perspective of the associative right the Supreme Court has recognized, but in 
light of the recovery of a freestanding, distinct, and robust Assembly Clause 
that this substitute has replaced. 
Again, my goal here is more amplification than criticism.  Inazu has a 
very brief discussion at the beginning of the book concerning what he calls 
the “social vision of assembly.”94  In addition to enabling meaningful dissent, 
he notes that the right of assembly “provides a buffer between the individual 
and the state” and contributes to “the shaping and forming of identity.”95  As 
Inazu wryly observes, “We lose more than the shared experience of cheese 
fries and cheap beer when we bowl alone.”96 
I wish Inazu had elaborated on this “social vision.”97  If we accept 
Inazu’s account, then it follows that the collective forgetting of the freedom 
of assembly has imposed significant social and political costs on American 
society.  In some sense, it is true that constitutional rights are most important 
when the activities they protect are being directly challenged by the state.  
 
92. See INAZU, supra note 2, at 156–62 (discussing dissenting, political, and expressive 
assemblies).  Although Inazu raises some legitimate concerns regarding the interpretation of group 
messages, I am more optimistic regarding courts’ ability to assess meaning in this and other 
contexts.  See Timothy Zick, Cross Burning, Cockfighting, and Symbolic Meaning: Toward a First 
Amendment Ethnography, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2261, 2375–79 (2004) (discussing judicial 
interpretation of group membership). 
93. INAZU, supra note 2, at 156. 
94. Id. at 5. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. As Inazu indicates, the “social vision of assembly” he describes is based upon the work of 
scholars such as Robert Putnam, Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Tayor, and Michael Sandel.  Id. at 5 
n.10. 
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However, it is also the case that the mere existence and recognition of an 
enforceable and robust constitutional right, such as the right to peaceably 
assemble with others, can serve critical functions which precede such 
challenges—and, indeed, may even prevent them from ever occurring.  
Further, even apart from any direct challenges by the state, the right of 
assembly can serve a variety of positive functions. 
First and perhaps foremost, freedom of assembly provides a degree of 
safety and comfort in numbers.  It is true, as discussed above, that this same 
attribute may increase the danger arising from assemblies.  However, let us 
assume for the moment that we are talking only about “peaceable” 
assemblies.  It may be difficult for contemporary Americans to appreciate the 
fear those accused in the 1950s of being Communists, or fellow travelers, 
experienced when they engaged in the simple act of meeting with others in 
private or public settings.98  The ability to freely assemble or join with others 
fortifies individuals.  It emboldens them to come forward, and to participate 
in social and political activities.  In addition to creating space for group 
activities and group autonomy, the freedom of assembly facilitates a variety 
of individual acts of defiance, contention, and expression. 
Freedom of assembly also serves various emotional and psychological 
functions.  The act of assembly creates a sense of solidarity or common 
cause.  It excites and energizes individuals, whether they gather to knit 
scarves, play soccer, pray, or participate in marches or protests.  It fosters 
personal and civic pride by providing outlets and venues for the pursuit of 
common causes.  Freedom of assembly does not simply allow individuals to 
develop their own identities.  It allows otherwise marginalized individuals to 
be present with others and to communicate specific identity claims to the 
state and to the general public.  For many individuals, this is a critical aspect 
not only of self-governance but also of personal self-esteem.  In sum, a 
robust freedom to peaceably assemble with others facilitates full participation 
in and enjoyment of communal life. 
In political terms, the freedom of assembly encourages and facilitates 
forms of local engagement.  It provides foundation and structure for social 
and political projects.  The ability to join with like-minded others allows 
citizens to form political associations and encourages them to contemplate 
future endeavors and initiatives.  This may lead to new and unique 
institutions, including new political organizations and parties.  Further, 
freedom of assembly strengthens and amplifies individual voices.  It forces 
 
98. See Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 103 (1961) (holding 
that the right to assemble is secondary to the right of Congress “to bring foreign-dominated 
organizations out into the open where the public can evaluate their activities informedly against the 
revealed background of their character, nature, and connections”); David E. Bernstein, The Red 
Menace, Revisited, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (2006) (reviewing MARTIN H. REDISH, THE 
LOGIC OF PERSECUTION: FREE EXPRESSION AND THE MCCARTHY ERA (2005)) (providing 
background information about the Smith Act and other restrictions aimed at communists that 
limited the right of assembly). 
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officials and other members of the community to take notice by providing a 
rough depiction of individual preferences.  In these representative and 
democratic senses, assembly acts as an informal method of voting or casting 
preferences—a way of marking or identifying oneself, often through public 
affiliations, as supportive of a particular position, cause, or side.  Note that 
assembly serves this particular function whether individuals form a group at 
the fringes of societal norms or one situated within a majority consensus. 
Inazu suggests that the reason for protecting groups’ membership and 
leadership choices is that “the existence of a group and its selection of 
members and leaders are themselves forms of expression.”99  This obviously 
raises the question whether the freedom of assembly he espouses is cut from 
the same speech cloth as the right of expressive association.100  I don’t think 
that it is.  However, had Inazu placed more emphasis on the individual social 
and political benefits of assembly, the separation would have been much 
clearer.  Many of these functions are nonexpressive.  They are a form of 
social sustenance and a critical part of our political structure.  On this view, 
the fact that assembly protects the Boy Scouts’ ability to express its 
preferences through exclusion is not the central point.  The critical aspects of 
assembly lie beneath the surface of that public message; they are antecedent 
to the state’s challenge to it. 
Inazu’s account of freedom of assembly is primarily political rather than 
sociological.  However, elaborating somewhat on the positive and personal 
functions of assembly would have clarified the extent of assembly’s 
independence from speech.  More importantly, it would have allowed for a 
fuller recovery and explication of the variety of functions served by the 
freedom of assembly. 
IV. Assembly and Outdoor Contention 
As I noted earlier, perhaps the most natural interpretation of the 
Assembly Clause is that it protects an individual’s right to gather with others 
for some limited period in a public place in order to pursue some common 
cause.  Thus, whenever and wherever two people gather in a public place 
where they have a right to be, for lawful and peaceful purposes, the 
Assembly Clause ought to protect their right to do so.  As citizens of 
authoritarian nations will attest, this is not some secondary or minimal 
constitutional concern.101  Where the freedom of assembly is recognized and 
 
99. INAZU, supra note 2, at 152. 
100. See Bhagwat, supra note 63, at 1383 (questioning Inazu’s account insofar as it relies upon 
expressive values). 
101. See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, New Russian Law Assesses Heavy Fines on Protesters, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/09/world/europe/putin-signs-law-with-
harsh-fines-for-protesters-in-russia.html (reporting on enactment of a new Russian law restricting 
street demonstrations); Jim Yardley, China Sets Zones for Olympics Protests, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 24, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/24/sports/olympics/24china.html?_r=3&ref=world 
396 Texas Law Review [Vol. 91:375 
 
 
enforced, authorities cannot without good cause require individuals to 
disperse, desist, disband, or move along.  This right to be and to remain in 
public places lies at the core of the right of peaceable assembly. 
Inazu has offered convincing reasons for recognizing other forms of 
assembly.  However, a recovered Assembly Clause would be as or even more 
important to outdoor politics than to the indoor membership decisions of 
civic organizations and private businesses.102  Admittedly, restrictions on 
public protest and assembly were not Inazu’s raison d’etre.  However, as I 
suggested earlier, a full recovery of the Assembly Clause will not be possible 
without some consideration of its relation to traditional forms of public 
assembly and contention.  Inazu’s account may offer some important insight 
with regard to this more traditional dimension of freedom of assembly.  I 
want to make this contribution more explicit, and to raise some issues that 
require further consideration by Inazu and others who are interested in more 
public forms of dissent and contention. 
In my own work, I have emphasized the necessity of adequate physical 
resources for the effective exercise of public speech, assembly, and petition 
rights.103  I have argued that over time, a variety of societal, political, and 
jurisprudential forces have reduced the supply of public space that is 
available to individuals and groups who wish to engage in expression and 
politics out of doors.  In brief, these and other forces have produced a 
significantly diminished public square.  In addition, even in the remaining 
public spaces, individuals who wish to engage in speech, assembly, and 
petition activities are too often displaced by a variety of regulatory 
mechanisms, including the construction of “speech zones.”104 
Had it been published prior to my own, Inazu’s book would have 
provided welcome support for my thesis regarding access to public spaces, 
particularly public forums.  According to the Supreme Court, these are places 
such as public streets and parks, which have “time out of mind” been 
available “for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between 
citizens, and discussing public questions.”105  As Inazu notes, in the early 
1980s the Supreme Court “swept the remnants of assembly within the ambit 
of free speech law.”106  There assembly’s remnants were combined with 
increasingly anemic public speech and petition rights, which were 
 
&pagewanted=print (discussing China’s repression of free speech assembly rights and the country’s 
attempt to appear less repressive by creating “free speech zones” during the 2008 Olympics). 
102. For a recent treatment of this aspect of assembly, see generally Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The 
Neglected Right of Assembly, 56 UCLA L. REV. 543 (2009). 
103. TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN 
PUBLIC PLACES 3–4 (2009). 
104. Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial Tactics, 84 TEXAS L. REV. 581, 636 (2006). 
105. Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); see also Perry Educ. Ass’n v. 
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (describing public forum categories). 
106. INAZU, supra note 2, at 61. 
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themselves hemmed in by an increasingly restrictive system of bureaucratic 
regulations.107 
Although Inazu focuses primarily on internal group autonomy, his 
account of the Assembly Clause has important implications for public 
assembly and contention.  To examine some of these implications, I want to 
consider Inazu’s account against the background of the Occupy Wall Street 
(OWS) demonstrations.  The demonstrations, which occurred across the 
United States (and indeed spread to several foreign nations) during the fall of 
2011,108 are contemporary examples of the sort of public contention that was 
common during assembly’s robust abolitionist, labor, and civil rights periods.  
In part for the reasons Inazu points to in his book, public discussions and 
litigation involving the OWS protests focused almost exclusively on free 
speech concerns.109  This was so even though the Assembly Clause’s 
language most closely captures the OWS signature repertoire—gathering in 
public for a common purpose or purposes. 
According to Inazu, “The right of assembly is a presumptive right of 
individuals to form and participate in peaceable, noncommercial groups.”110  
OWS is clearly a noncommercial group, and thus entitled to presumptive 
protection under the Assembly Clause.111  In addition, the OWS 
demonstrations served all of the core functions of assembly.  They provided 
critical outlets for dissenters, nonconformists, and dissidents.  OWS 
demonstrations allowed and perhaps emboldened individuals to challenge 
consensus norms.112  The assemblies facilitated public dissent, politicized 
group activity, and provided channels for expression.  They created space 
within which citizens could resist governmental control.  The ability to 
assemble with others in common public spaces provided incubation space for 
a potential social movement.  Further, the OWS assemblies allowed 
individuals to experiment with unique forms of democratic organization.113  
 
107. See generally ZICK, supra note 103 (discussing the restriction of public speech rights 
under the First Amendment’s public forum and time, place, and manner doctrines). 
108. Occupy Wall Street Protests Spread, But Can the Movement Gain Critical Mass?, WASH. 
POST, Oct. 13, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/occupy-wall-street-protests-spread-
but-can-the-movement-gain-critical-mass/2011/10/13/gIQAzOM2hL_print.html. 
109. See, e.g., Occupy Minneapolis v. Cnty. of Hennepin, Civ. No. 11-3412 (RHK/TNL), 2011 
WL 5878359, at *4 (D. Minn. Nov. 23, 2011) (holding that sleeping or erecting tents on public 
property by Occupy protesters is protected free speech). 
110. INAZU, supra note 2, at 166. 
111. See Shelley DuBois, Occupy Wall Street: Yes, There is Organization, CNN MONEY  
(Dec. 7, 2011, 11:35 AM), http://management.fortune.cnn.com/2011/12/07/occupy-wall-street-yes-
there-is-organization/ (describing the “grassroots,” noncommercial organization of the Occupy 
Movement). 
112. Cf. INAZU, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the importance of informal group assembly to 
democracy). 
113. See Meredith Hoffman, Protestors Debate What Demands, If Any, to Make, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 16, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/17/nyregion/occupy-wall-street-trying-to-settle-on-
demands.html?ref=occupywallstreet&_r=moc.semityn.www (describing the democratic process for 
decision making). 
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OWS became well known not just for its outward displays of 
commandeering and camping in public places, but also for its internal 
methods of communication and unique approach to governance by 
consensus.114  Finally, as have other public assemblies, the OWS 
demonstrations “disrupt[ed] social norms and consensus thinking.”115  They 
initiated a national and international conversation concerning issues like 
social equality, fairness, capitalism, and political representation.116 
Perhaps the most frequently commented-upon aspect of the OWS 
demonstrations, at least in the mainstream media, was the apparent lack of a 
coherent message associated with the demonstrations or the group itself.117  
Here Inazu offers a key insight.  The First Amendment does not protect 
assembly solely for the purpose of communicating some identifiable, 
coherent message.  Assembly is protected in its own right; it stands on its 
own bottom.  The act of assembling is thus itself the relevant constitutional 
event.  If individuals want to assemble for the purpose of snapping their 
fingers, chanting in tongues, or simply showing solidarity or strength through 
numbers, then they have a First Amendment right to do so (subject, of 
course, to any permitting and other requirements).  Under this approach to 
freedom of assembly, no further explication of the specific content of OWS’s 
message would be required.118  This is a critical point, for public assemblies 
can often be disorganized, spontaneous, cacophonous, and incoherent. 
In the context of the OWS demonstrations, we can more fully appreciate 
the value of a freestanding freedom of assembly.  Thus, perhaps the most 
significant move Inazu makes in his volume turns out to be textual.  By 
divorcing assembly and petition, he allows for the development of a distinct 
freedom of assembly.  This freedom grants the people the right to be present 
in and to use certain public places.  They may of course do so to speak or to 
petition government officials.  But these activities and rights are distinct from 
the right to peaceably assemble. 
Thus, a full recovery of the Assembly Clause clarifies the extent of the 
government’s trust obligation regarding public places under its control.  It 
highlights the scope of the “easement” the people possess when they occupy 
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/10/opinion/krugman-money-and-
morals.html?gwh=1B8B872410A8FFE1376708CD918AFF25. 
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and use public forums.119  There has long been some level of discomfort 
relating to the idea that the First Amendment imposes an affirmative 
obligation on officials to provide space or other resources for the peoples’ 
exercise of constitutional rights.  However, if the First Amendment protects 
not only discrete activities like speech and petition, but also simple presence 
in public places, then it begins to look very much as if the First Amendment 
contemplates a degree of affirmative support.  After all, assembly had to take 
place somewhere, and the most natural or obvious place would be something 
like a public square.  Interpreting the Assembly Clause as an independent 
form of refuge for public dissent fortifies the argument that the First 
Amendment was intended, at least in part, to facilitate public presence and 
outdoor politics. 
Indeed, recovery of the Assembly Clause might alter or clarify a number 
of First Amendment doctrines and principles relating to public protests, 
demonstrations, and other forms of outdoor politics like the OWS 
demonstrations.  Let me highlight just a few examples. 
The Supreme Court has attempted to explain how a parade with no 
clearly identifiable message nevertheless constitutes either a form of 
expressive conduct or an expressive association.120  However, once the 
parade is properly characterized and analyzed as an assembly, courts need 
not attempt to interpret such gatherings.  This insight applies to a variety of 
public gatherings.  For example, where individuals have gathered in a public 
park for the purpose of feeding the homeless, the fact that no particularized 
message would be discernible to the public would not make any difference 
under the Assembly Clause.121  These and other unique but nonexpressive 
gatherings could find refuge under the Assembly Clause even if protection is 
not available to them under the Free Speech Clause or the expressive 
association doctrine. 
The Court has also indicated that picketing on a public sidewalk near a 
person’s residence may be entitled to less protection under the Free Speech 
Clause because the protesters did not seek to communicate with a broad 
public audience.122  That observation, and potential limitation, is simply 
irrelevant in the context of the freedom to peaceably assemble on a public 
sidewalk—the actual activity in question.  Further, resort in some cases to the 
Assembly Clause, which by its terms protects a form of conduct, could 
reduce some of the considerable pressure the courts have placed on the 
speech–conduct distinction.  Indeed, recovery of the Assembly Clause might 
 
119. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. 
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2010), vacated, 616 F.3d 1229 (11th Cir. 2010), reinstated in part, 638 F.3d 756 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(upholding permit requirements as applied to the feeding of homeless in public parks). 
122. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 486–88 (1988). 
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at long last elevate demonstrating, marching, and labor picketing to the status 
of fully protected First Amendment activities rather than allowing them to be 
consigned to the lesser-protected rung of expressive conduct.123 
In many public protest cases decided after the 1960s, including several 
involving protests near abortion clinics, the Court has used free speech and 
time, place, and manner doctrines to examine the constitutionality of limits 
on public contention and dissent.124  The primary concern in those cases was 
to what extent speakers should have a meaningful opportunity to engage with 
their intended audiences.125  Indeed, in numerous contexts, courts have 
reviewed regulatory requirements that implicate freedom of assembly, 
including permit and insurance provisions, as if they affect only the freedom 
of speech.126  However, these regulations may have separate and significant 
effects on assembly rights.  Suppose that courts refocused the inquiry in such 
a way that assembly rather than speech became the primary concern.  It is 
possible that something like the time, place, and manner doctrine would 
develop in this context.  However, it is also possible that different 
considerations would lead to distinct doctrinal formulations and perhaps even 
to an expansion of public protest rights. 
Let me return a final time to the OWS demonstrations.  As noted earlier, 
the Assembly Clause contains a textual limitation.  It recognizes a right 
“peaceably to assemble.”  Inazu does not offer a definitive interpretation of 
this text.  It is clear that the Assembly Clause does not protect riotous mobs.  
Certainly an assembly that engages in vandalism or violent acts can be 
suppressed.  Further, under free speech doctrine authorities may impose basic 
limitations on public demonstrations for the purpose of ensuring public order 
and safety.127 
 
123. This would require revisiting statements by the Supreme Court in civil rights-era cases to 
the effect that the First Amendment provides less protection to acts such as assembly than it does to 
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127. See Hill, 530 U.S. at 713–14 (explaining that protecting the safety of individuals is a 
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The OWS demonstrations pressed the boundaries of these limits.128  
Insofar as OWS participants were unlawfully present in private spaces, let us 
assume that the freedom of assembly offered them no refuge.  But in many 
cases, protesters sought to permanently occupy public forums and other 
public venues.129  Were these “peaceable” assemblies?  As I noted earlier, 
one could argue that the original or traditional understanding was that the 
Assembly Clause contemplated the formation and relatively brief presence of 
the people in public places.  However, there is nothing in the Assembly 
Clause itself that suggests any kind of temporal limitation.  There is nothing 
violent or unpeaceable about the mere act of assembly or even of occupation.  
So long as the occupation does not disrupt the flow of pedestrian or other 
traffic, violate any time restriction, or violate noise ordinances and the like, 
what basis is there for requiring the assembly to disperse?130 
It seems that at least two fundamental questions must be answered.  The 
first, as I have already suggested, is whether we ought simply to incorporate 
all of the various time, place, and manner requirements that are not deemed 
generally to abridge freedom of speech131 into the assembly context.  In that 
case, courts would likely equate “peaceably” with lawfully.  This would 
essentially mean that in public places where individuals have a right to 
congregate, the freedom of assembly is coextensive with the freedom of 
speech.  However, this would be inconsistent with recognition of a distinct 
and separate freedom of peaceable assembly.  Second, and perhaps more 
fundamentally, we need to address whether the Assembly Clause provides 
some refuge for certain forms of civil disobedience.132  Since freedom of 
assembly was not seriously considered in the OWS litigation, the courts 
never reached these issues. 
Like the outer bounds of group autonomy Inazu discusses, none of the 
foregoing issues has yet received any significant attention in connection with 
the Assembly Clause.  If or once they do, however, we may find that the First 
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Amendment affords some additional measure of refuge for traditional forms 
of public protest and contention.  Inazu’s partial recovery of the Assembly 
Clause ought to motivate civil rights litigators, scholars, and courts to start 
thinking more carefully about assembly’s implications in the more traditional 
contexts of public protest and demonstration. 
Conclusion 
Liberty’s Refuge is an enlightening account of a First Amendment 
freedom that has for too long languished in the shadow of freedom of speech 
and under the weight of a judicially conceived right of expressive 
association.  The Assembly Clause may never again be feted at something 
like a World’s Fair.  As Inazu shows, the more immediate impact of its 
recovery would be felt more locally.  Private, nonconforming groups would 
gain a fuller measure of autonomy from a recovered freedom of assembly.  In 
addition, as I have argued, individuals would enjoy the social and political 
benefits of a robust and recovered freedom of assembly.  Finally, as I have 
also suggested, traditional public assemblies would occupy firmer 
constitutional ground.  We owe a debt to Inazu for his exhumation of a 
once—and still—fundamental constitutional liberty.  Inazu has invited us to 
participate in a conversation about a long-forgotten freedom, and has 
provided compelling reasons to accept this invitation.  I look forward to 
reading his future work and to future discussions regarding the recovered 
freedom of assembly. 
